The year 2025 has gone down in history as a period in which geopolitical tensions reached a peak and the global economy struggled to recover. The prolonged Russia–Ukraine War, the spread of conflicts in the Middle East, and the deepening climate crisis have once again reminded the international community of the need for stability, responsibility, and fair global governance. In this atmosphere of uncertainty, China has stood out by encouraging coordination among major powers, increasing constructive engagement, and promoting a framework of peaceful coexistence. China’s foreign policy moves in 2025 strengthened the liberal international relations framework, especially Neoliberal Institutionalism (Robert Keohane) and Liberal Soft Power Theory (Joseph Nye). As emphasized by Xi Jinping, “Major countries should take special responsibilities in their relations that concern global strategic stability.” This approach reflects the core principles of liberal international relations theory. In particular, China’s responsibilities in 2025 have become prominent in terms of interdependence, cooperation through institutions, and soft power.[i]
From a liberal perspective, China’s role represents positioning itself as a stakeholder in non-hegemonic global governance, as defined by Keohane in his work After Hegemony (1984). Keohane argues that international institutions enable states to go beyond egoistic interests and produce collective benefits.[ii] China’s diplomatic moves in 2025 served the purpose of reducing uncertainty by strengthening these institutions. Similarly, Nye’s concept of Soft Power (2004) shows that China provides stability through economic attractiveness and cultural diplomacy. Nye stated that the liberal order can be sustained by evolving with rising powers such as China. If this order is not maintained, the risk of falling into the Thucydides Trap increases.[iii]
China’s Responsible Stakeholder Role within the Framework of Liberal Theory
Liberal international relations, inspired by Immanuel Kant’s idea of Perpetual Peace (1795), assume that trade promotes peace and that institutions manage conflict. China’s role in 2025 makes this theory more concrete. By increasing South–South cooperation through Major Power Initiatives (such as the Global Development Initiative), China has expanded the inclusiveness of the liberal order. The 2005 call for a “Responsible Stakeholder” by former U.S. Deputy Secretary of State Robert Zoellick appears as a strategy aimed at integrating China into the liberal order. In 2025, China has taken on this role by contributing to global public goods (such as economic growth and climate stability) and managing uncertainty through institutional mechanisms in a Keohanean sense.[iv]
Keohane and Nye’s neoliberalism views China’s rise as an opportunity. Keohane argues in Power and Interdependence (1977) that economic ties reduce security risks. China’s economic diplomacy in 2025 strengthens this interdependence. Nye, on the other hand, states that China’s soft power, for example through the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), can spread liberal values.[v] However, it warns that authoritarian tendencies could lead to the erosion of order. China, which joined the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 2001, has contributed $30 trillion to global growth by adopting liberal trading rules.[vi] Similarly, China’s commitments in the 2015 Paris Climate Agreement are creating collective action through institutions. These examples demonstrate China’s adaptation to the liberal order. By 2025, China is driving the evolution of the order by deepening its global role.
Stability in China-Russia Relations
In 2025, China-Russia relations charted a new course with reciprocal visits by the two leaders. Strategic security consultation mechanisms functioned smoothly, regional cooperation strengthened, and the comprehensive strategic partnership became more resilient in the new era. Xi Jinping stated, “This year, China and Russia aimed for higher-quality development by calmly managing the turbulent external environment.” Within this framework, visa exemption was introduced, anticipating 3.5 million reciprocal visits; and 80 projects worth $200 billion were announced at the SME Forum.[vii]
This relationship reflects Keohane’s theory of interdependence. Energy and trade ties between China and Russia reduce the risk of conflict. Nye argues that this partnership offers an alternative to Europe as soft power, but improves global governance by strengthening liberal institutions, such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). For example, the 1996 Shanghai Five ensured post-Cold War stability. In the context of Ukraine, China’s mediation embodied the ideal of liberal peace, adapting Zoellick’s concept of stakeholders to Russia.[viii]
Restructuring China-US Relations
The year 2025 has been defined as a restructuring of China-US relations. Four phone calls between Xi and Trump, and their face-to-face meeting in South Korea, have stabilized the two giant economies. Fundamental agreements have been reached on trade; military channels have been kept open, and maritime security talks have continued.[ix] Following these developments, Xi stated, “History and reality have taught us that China and the US should be partners and friends.” Between January and October 2025, 3,500 Chinese companies participated in trade shows in the US; US booths broke records at the China Import Expo. Culturally, the “Gulingyuan” Youth Choir Week brought together 1,000 young people.[x] In 2025, interdependence prevented war. Compromises and trade agreements revitalized the WTO. For example, the 1972 ping-pong diplomacy paved the way for Nixon’s visit to China. Today, the Trump-Xi talks have provided a similar détente and reinforced liberal flexibility.
A Brilliant 50 Years in China-EU Relations
The 50th anniversary of diplomatic relations between China and the EU was celebrated in 2025. The strategic value of the partnership position was clarified. The 25th Summit in Beijing and the visits of European leaders underscored cooperation.[xi]
Xi has proposed three principles for relations with Europe: “Mutual respect, openness, and multilateralism.” In September 2025, central banks renewed their currency swap agreements. The China-Europe Railway reached 118,600 journeys. Chang’e-5 moon models were loaned to Europe. Inter-institutional differences were strategically managed to create mutual benefit. Furthermore, green cooperation was used as soft power; China’s climate commitments, liberal values, and sustainability were transformed into a common denominator.[xii] The diplomatic ties established in 1975 supported Deng Xiaoping’s reforms. The 2025 Summit renewed this legacy, contributing to a multipolar liberal order.
China’s 2025 initiatives have enhanced South-South cooperation through the Four Global Initiatives. China has assessed its diplomatic and strategic role in the face of global uncertainties in 2025 within the epistemological framework of Liberal International Relations Theory. The findings show that China, instead of the inevitable power struggle predicted by Realism, has embraced the principles of cooperation, interdependence, and multilateralism central to Neoliberal Institutionalism (Keohane) and Soft Power Theory (Nye), thus making a constructive contribution to global stability.
China’s role demonstrates that liberal theory itself is undergoing a structural adaptation process. While classical liberalism generally focused on Western norms and political regimes, China’s rise as a “Responsible Stakeholder” signals that the liberal order is evolving towards a post-hegemonic regime where even diverse ideological regimes can integrate on the basis of shared rational benefit, rather than being governed by norms imposed by a single hegemonic power. China’s Four Global Initiatives function not as dismantling existing liberal institutions (UN, WTO), but as reforms to make them more inclusive and focused on South-South cooperation. This confirms Keohane’s thesis on the resilience and sustainability of international regimes, even by actors pursuing rational interests.
It has been emphasized that China’s complex interdependence in its relations with other actors in the system constitutes a fundamental stabilizing structure that reduces the risk of conflict. In particular, the recalibration process in China-US relations in 2025 has shown that even great powers rationally prefer compromise over conflict due to the systemic costs of severing economic ties. This proves that the Thucydides Trap is not an absolute fate, but a risk that can be managed through strong institutions and economic integration. Keeping trade, technology, and cultural diplomacy channels open confirms that Nye’s concept of soft power functions as a buffer mechanism that softens the sharpness of hard power competition.
While China does not embrace all the political values of the liberal order, it does adopt its practical benefits. This adaptation enhances China’s global legitimacy and inspires confidence in the international community to find solutions to common problems. These engagements, ranging from the Paris Climate Agreement to the Belt and Road Initiative’s infrastructure projects, demonstrate China’s commitment to its national interest and its responsibility to contribute to global public goods. This is a mature application of the responsible stakeholder role as defined by Zoellick in 2005.
China’s performance in 2025 offers three key implications for future global governance:
- Multipolar Institutionalism: The stability of the global system will depend not on a single hegemon, but on a multipolar network of international institutions reformed and sustained jointly by major actors such as China, the US, the EU, and Russia.
- Ideological Pragmatism: Cooperation between powers with different political systems will be made sustainable by overcoming ideological differences and basing it on pragmatic mutual benefit.
- Global Public Good Production: China’s increased investment in global public goods through its development and security initiatives will enhance the inclusiveness of the liberal order and ensure that the world economy benefits more fairly from the advantages of globalization.
[i] “How China played a responsible role in a year of global uncertainty”, CGTN, https://news.cgtn.com/news/2025-12-14/How-China-played-a-responsible-role-in-a-year-of-global-uncertainty-1J5wCcJ8zBK/share_amp.html, (Date of Access: 16.12.2025).
[ii] Keohane, R. O. (2015). After hegemony cooperation is still possible. The International Spectator, 50(4), 92-94.
[iii] “After the Liberal International Order”, China US Focus, https://www.chinausfocus.com/foreign-policy/after-the-liberal-international-order,(Date of Access: 16.12.2025).
[iv] “Whither China: From Membership to Responsibility?”, US Department of State, https://2001-2009.state.gov/s/d/former/zoellick/rem/53682.htm?safe=1, (Date of Access: 16.12.2025).
[v] Nye, J. S., Jr. (2020). Power and Interdependence with China. The Washington Quarterly, 43(1), 7–21. https://doi.org/10.1080/0163660X.2020.1734303
[vi] “China and the Asian Crisis”, IMF E-Library, https://www.elibrary.imf.org/display/book/9781589061781/ch007.xml, (Erişim Tarihi: 16.12.2025).
[vii] “China and Russia Hold Strategic Security Consultation”, Ministry of Foreign Affairs People’s Republic of China, https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/wjbzhd/202512/t20251203_11765732.html, (Date of Access: 16.12.2025).
[viii] “China As A Responsible Stakeholder? A Decade Later”, IIPS, https://indopacificsecurity.org/2016/04/26/china-as-a-responsible-stakeholder-a-decade-later/, (Date of Access: 16.12.2025).
[ix] “Ambassador Xie Feng: heads-of-state diplomacy is always the anchor of China-U.S. relations”, Embassy of People’s Republic of China in the United States of America, https://us.china-embassy.gov.cn/eng/dshd/202511/t20251115_11753905.htm, (Date of Access: 16.12.2025).
[x] China: Peng Liyuan attends the 2025 “Gulingyuan” Sino-US Youth Friendship Event. (2025, July 17). China Government News. https://link.gale.com/apps/doc/A848189092/AONE?u=anon~bd8fd917&sid=sitemap&xid=ca195d21
[xi] “25th EU-China summit – EU press release”, European Council, https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2025/07/24/25th-eu-china-summit-eu-press-release/, (Date of Access: 16.12.2025).
[xii] Ibid.