The meeting held on 27 January 2026 at the Great Hall of the People in Beijing between Chinese President Xi Jinping and Finnish Prime Minister Petteri Orpo constitutes a significant diplomatic development symbolizing the stability of bilateral relations and China’s strategy of high-standard opening-up. Xi encouraged Finnish enterprises to enter the Chinese market in order to enhance their global competitiveness, and proposed in-depth cooperation in areas such as energy transition, the circular economy, forestry and agriculture, and science- and technology-driven innovation. This metaphor represents a classic expression of China’s post-reform economic diplomacy and reflects an inclusive attraction strategy directed toward foreign investors.[i]
From an international relations perspective, this meeting highlights the economic interdependence of small states in an era of great power competition and foregrounds China’s “win–win” narrative. Finland is one of the first Western countries to have recognized China. Despite fluctuations in the international system, this relationship has continued on the principles of mutual respect, equality, and a future-oriented outlook. During the meeting, it was emphasized that Finland plays a “constructive role” in EU–China relations. Orpo’s emphasis on the “One China” policy and “strategic autonomy,” together with his commitment to resolving trade frictions, concretizes Finland’s hedging strategy.
China–Finland relations began in 1950 and went down in history as an early diplomatic move that was rare in the Western world. The opening of an embassy in Beijing in 1952 and the signing of the first bilateral trade agreement in 1953 as a capitalist country laid the foundations of the relationship. Throughout the Cold War, relations progressed uninterrupted thanks to Finland’s Paasikivi–Kekkonen (Neutrality–Pragmatism) Doctrine, and Finland supported China’s membership in the United Nations (UN). The Economic–Industrial–Scientific–Technological Cooperation Agreement in 1973 and the Science and Technology Agreement in 1986 ensured institutionalization. The declaration of a “new type of future-oriented cooperative partnership” during Xi’s visit to Finland in 2017, together with the Joint Action Plans for 2019–2023 and 2025–2029, increased strategic depth.[ii] More recently, Stubb’s visit to Beijing in October 2025 and Orpo’s visit in January 2026 have confirmed the continuity of high-level dialogue.[iii] Telephone conversations during the Covid-19 period and panda diplomacy have emphasized the resilience of the relationship.[iv]
Bilateral trade reached USD 8.2 billion in 2024, and the two-way stock of investment exceeded USD 23 billion. Finland is China’s third-largest partner in Northern Europe, while China is Finland’s leading partner in Asia. Finland’s main exports to China consist of sulfate chemical wood pulp, nickel, and paper machinery. Imports from China include phones, electric batteries, and computers. Although data for November 2025 indicate a positive balance, the five-year decline stands at approximately 1.54 percent. However, Orpo’s visit is expected to generate new momentum in bilateral relations.[v] Finland’s strategy of sustainable forestry and clean technology know-how aligns with China’s market scale and the green objectives of the 15th Five-Year Plan.[vi]
The areas of cooperation demonstrate strategic alignment. Clean energy constitutes one of these areas. Finland’s expertise in wind and geothermal energy can support China’s decarbonization efforts. The circular economy (waste management, bio-economy) and forestry represent Finland’s competitive advantages. Recent engagements in 2026 may trigger new agreements in the digital economy and agriculture.
Finland’s accession to NATO in 2023 has generated a potential source of tension in bilateral relations. Chinese media interpreted this development as falling into the “claws of the hegemon,” and Arctic cooperation was subsequently withdrawn by Finland. However, Orpo’s constructive stance during his visit to Beijing may open a new chapter in relations. Finland may play a bridging role within the European Union as a moderate actor on China-related issues.
Orpo’s emphasis on free trade carries the potential to resolve EU–China tariffs. This reflects the intersection of neoliberal institutionalism and realism. Small states create room for maneuver between great powers. Finland’s commitment to the “One China” policy constitutes an element of trust.[vii] The Orpo–Xi meeting has reinforced the paradigm of stability and deepening in China–Finland relations. Historical precedence, economic interdependence, and diplomatic pragmatism carry a 76-year legacy into the future. In particular, between 2026 and 2030, an increase in concrete projects in clean energy and the circular economy is expected. In this sense, bilateral trade may also exceed USD 10 billion. Finland will position itself as a leading actor in sustainability and technology within the Chinese market, and cooperation in 5G/AI will expand.
China highlights pragmatic members such as Finland, thereby softening the European Union’s risk-taking posture and expanding the Global South coalition in a multipolar world. The metaphor of high-quality opening-up and a vast market accelerates technological upgrading by attracting foreign investment. From Finland’s perspective, hedging and pendulum strategies are optimal. Finland’s pursuit of economic diversification with China provides an advantage in the face of EU slowdown and the risk of Trump 2.0.
Among the potential risks, the escalation of trade wars between the European Union and China and competition in the Arctic region stand out. By contrast, the opportunities lie in leadership in the green transformation. In this context, the establishment of a sustainable development cooperation platform between the two countries and the initiation of second-generation initiatives in winter sports within the cultural sphere could strengthen relations. Ultimately, this relationship demonstrates that small states can assume a creative mediating role between great powers. This relationship will continue to serve as a model for similar relations in the 2030s.
[i] “Xi welcomes Finnish enterprises to ‘take a swim in the vast ocean of the Chinese market’”, Xinhua, https://english.news.cn/20260127/af185eff3d4b46d9b97adf1592ed6915/c.html, (Access Date: 28.01.2026); “President Xi Jinping Meets with Finnish Prime Minister Petteri Orpo”, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/xw/zyxw/202601/t20260127_11846160.html, (Access Date: 28.01.2026).
[ii] “China and Finland”, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/gjhdq_665435/3265_665445/3286_664530/, (Access Date: 28.01.2026).
[iii] “Finland Retreats From the Polar Silk Road”, High North News, https://en.highnorthnews.com/op-ed/finland-retreats-from-the-polar-silk-road/204066, (Access Date: 28.01.2026).
[iv] “Xi and Stubb mark 75 years of China–Finland ties”, Helsinki Times, https://www.helsinkitimes.fi/finland/finland-news/politics/28151-xi-and-stubb-mark-75-years-of-china-finland-ties.html, (Access Date: 28.01.2026).
[v] “Finland & China”, OEC, https://oec.world/en/profile/bilateral-country/fin/partner/chn, (Access Date: 28.01.2026).
[vi] Deepening of Sino-Finnish ties stressed”, China Daily, https://www.chinadaily.com.cn/a/202601/27/WS6978de76a310d6866eb360d8.html, (Access Date: 28.01.2026).
[vii] Yang, N. (2023). How China perceives European strategic autonomy: asymmetric expectations and pragmatic engagement. The Chinese Journal of International Politics, 16(4), 482–505.