When examined from a sociological perspective, the gender dynamic in China stands out as an area that reveals the tense interplay between traditional patriarchal structures and processes of modernization. In South Korea, the sharp polarization between young men’s growing conservatism and young women’s liberal tendencies has become evident in election results and has impacted social stability. In China, a similar “gap” is observed, with women’s egalitarian attitudes and men’s attachment to traditional roles becoming increasingly deeper.[1]
In this context, according to Anthony Giddens, there is a dual relationship between social structures and individual actions; structures both make action possible and are reproduced or transformed by actions. From this perspective, gender relations in China can be understood as part of a process in which traditional structures are being dismantled within the reflexive nature of modernity (through globalization, the internet, and market reforms). While individuals, particularly younger generations, reflexively follow and transform gender norms, state policies and cultural legacies constrain this process.
Anthony Giddens’s Structuration Theory accepts neither the absolute freedom of the individual (agent) nor the absolute determinism of social structures. According to Giddens, structure has a dual nature: it both restricts action and makes it possible. Young Chinese women are using internet culture, anonymous forums, popular culture, and their economic independence as “resources” to develop their own agency in response to this structure.[2]
The evolution of gender ideology in China has become increasingly complex with the switch from the egalitarian discourse of the Mao era to market reforms. This demonstrates, as Giddens emphasizes in his theory of modernity, that mechanisms of detachment (the disruption of traditional bonds by abstract systems) have restructured gender roles. However, this transformation has not brought about equality; rather, it has created new tensions. The growing anti-feminist backlash in South Korea and the return of young men in China to the “men as providers” ideology reflect a similar crisis of reflexive modernity.[3]
Historically, the chronological evolution of gender perspectives in China begins with Confucian patriarchal roots and extends to the modern state. In the traditional period, the patrilineal system positioned men as the bearers of family inheritance and the family name, while limiting women to domestic roles; this structure, in Giddens’ terminology, is one in which routine practices reproduce the social order. The Mao Zedong era (1949–1976) partially shattered this structure by adopting egalitarian policies under the slogan “women carry half the sky,” thereby increasing women’s participation in the workforce.
However, this state-driven equality is not the outcome of individual agency but rather a product of the central structure. As Giddens critiques, the non-transformability of structures without agency is evident here. The Reform and Opening Period (post-1978) led to a rebirth of traditional roles alongside the market economy. The weakening of women’s position in the labor market reinforced the ideology of “men prioritizing careers, women prioritizing family,” and the division of labor within the home became traditionalized. A one-child policy (1979–2015) dramatized this process; the preference for sons pushed the gender ratio to 120 boys per 100 girls, creating millions of “missing women.” This demographic imbalance overlaps with Giddens’ concept of the risk society. The unintended consequences of modernity have altered family structures, giving rise to new uncertainties. In the post-policy era (beginning in 2016), the state has redirected women back toward household and childbearing roles through a three-child incentive program; however, social media and globalization have raised awareness among young women.[4]
Data from the China General Social Survey (CGSS) clearly illustrate the shift in gender ideology. From the 1990s to the 2010s, market reforms reinforced the “male provider” model through women’s retreat from the labor market; Zhang and others (2025) found that women’s economic dependence during this period reinforced traditional norms. However, after 2010, egalitarian attitudes have increased due to the influence of the internet and social media.[5]
According to a report published by CGSS in 2021, while 80% of couples believe household chores should be shared, women hold more egalitarian views than men. Among young women, the “gender gap” is significant; while women embrace equality more in the public sphere, traditional norms persist in the private sphere (within the home). A consistent conservatism is observed among men. When these findings are analyzed through Giddens’ concept of reflexivity, it becomes apparent that young people continuously engage with gender roles in the information society but remain constrained by structural barriers. Critically, while these data may appear egalitarian, they hide the fact that women’s burdens have increased in practice; with sociological diligence, the ideology-practice gap confirms Giddens’s dilemma. [6]
A comparative sociological analysis with South Korea sheds light on the potential polarization of gender perceptions in China. In South Korea, while young men perceive feminist policies as “male discrimination” and gravitate toward conservative parties (with 59% of young men supporting them in the 2022 elections), young women tend to lean toward liberal views. In China, a similar divide is evident not yet in political elections but in attitudes. In China, the state suppresses feminism as a “foreign influence” to keep this divide under control; in South Korea, open debate has deepened the polarization.[7]
The Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) gender policies can be viewed as “institutional dimensions” within Giddens’s structuration theory. The aftermath of the one-child policy (including gender imbalance and a surplus of 30 million men) has led the CCP to promote a “return to the family” policy for women in the face of a demographic crisis. While this reproduces traditional structures, it suppresses the choices of young women. Data from the CGSS in 2021 shows that patrilineal values fuel attitudes of gender inequality. The state protects this structure in the name of “social stability.” Just as in South Korea, the conservatism of young men in China overlaps with hyper-meritocracy and anti-feminist backlash. However, in China, this manifests not in elections but on social media and in the marriage market. The contradiction between the CCP’s rhetoric of equality (official feminism) and practical discrimination (labor force, wage gaps) mirrors Giddens’ observation that while modernization promises equality, structural forces reproduce inequality. Politically, this divide could evolve into a polarization of the electorate (young men to the right, women to the left) in the future.
This structural incompatibility creates deep dissatisfaction for both genders. According to Giddens, individuals who lose their ontological security fall into existential anxiety. The millions of men in China who cannot marry and are struggling with poverty in rural areas represent a serious risk of social unrest. These “surplus men (bare branches/guanggun)” are a potential source of instability for the regime. On the other hand, there are “surplus women (shengnu)” in cities, which are highly educated, well-paid, yet choosing to remain single due to patriarchal expectations. These concepts themselves are linguistic manifestations of how the structure excludes individuals.[8]
As a result, the deepening ideological divide between young women and men in China, when interpreted through Giddens’ concepts of structuration and reflexive modernization, reveals itself as a painful and existential systemic crisis of late modernity. As the South Korean example clearly demonstrates, the drift of young men, having lost their ontological security, toward a conservative-nationalist ground with state support, coupled with the radical “silent boycott” developed by young women, who are constructing their own agency through education and economic independence, against the patriarchal institution of marriage, could drive the country into an irreversible demographic and socio-economic dead end.
[1] “China’s Growing Gender Divide”, GGD World, https://www.ggd.world/p/chinas-growing-gender-divide, (Date Accessed: 24.03.2026).
[2] Giddens, A. (2014). Structuration theory: past, present and future. In Giddens’ theory of structuration (pp. 201-221). Routledge.
[3] “Why South Korean young men and women are more politically divided than ever”, Los Angeles Times, https://www.latimes.com/world-nation/story/2025-07-03/why-south-korean-young-men-and-women-are-more-politically-divided-than-ever, (Date Accessed: 24.03.2026).
[4] “Millions of missing women: China grapples with legacy of one-child policy as population ages”, The Guardian, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/nov/15/millions-of-missing-women-china-grapples-with-legacy-of-one-child-policy-as-population-ages, (Date Accessed: 24.03.2026).
[5] Zhang, C., Tong, X., & Liu, A. (2025). Sociological studies on women/gender in China during the past 40 years. Chinese Journal of Sociology, 11(2), 161-190.
[6] Ibid.
[7] “The Fight Over Gender Equality in South Korea”, Carnegie endowment, https://carnegieendowment.org/research/2025/04/the-fight-over-gender-equality-in-south-korea, (Date Accessed: 24.03.2026); “Has China’s Progress Toward Women’s Equality Stalled?”, China Power, https://chinapower.csis.org/china-gender-inequality/, (Date Accessed: 24.03.2026).
[8] Jiang, Q., & Sánchez-Barricarte, J. J. (2011). Bare branches and social stability: A historical perspective from China. Frontiers of History in China, 6(4), 538-561.